The Belgian federal government has formally committed to opening its subsidised passenger rail market to competition from 2033, approving a phased transition to competitive tendering once the national operator’s current contract ends.

The federal cabinet endorsed the reform strategy on July 18, settling a question that successive governments had studied for years without choosing a definitive market model. This marks the first formal political commitment to a phased tendering approach for the post-2032 network, moving beyond earlier discussions of pilot projects or alternative structures.

SNCB’s 2023–32 public service contract was awarded directly under transitional provisions in European Union legislation, before competitive tendering became the general rule for rail public service contracts in December 2023. Its expiry requires Belgium to establish a new system for awarding and managing subsidised domestic passenger services.

The cabinet decision sets the broad direction but leaves the detailed market structure unresolved. Federal mobility minister Jean-Luc Crucke must now develop the proposed architecture and implementation timetable, including the sequence of tenders and arrangements for managing a network operated under multiple contracts, before returning the plan to the cabinet for approval.

How the phased transition would work

The government said the reform would rest on four elements:

• Phased competitive tendering: Subsidised passenger services would be divided into separate contracts and brought to market progressively, rather than tendering the entire network at once. SNCB could compete for contracts alongside rival operators.
• A transitional SNCB contract: When the current agreement expires on December 31 2032, SNCB would receive a directly awarded, progressively shrinking contract covering services for which no tender had yet been completed. Those services would be removed as successive packages were tendered and awarded.
• A stronger federal contracting authority: A public authority would handle strategic design of passenger services, determining contract scope, organising tenders and supervising agreements. The government said it would require sufficient staffing and technical and regulatory expertise.
• Common co-ordination, fares and ticketing: Mechanisms would maintain technical interoperability, co-ordinate timetables between subsidised and commercial services, and ensure efficient use of infrastructure and rolling stock. Uniform fares and ticketing would be retained within the public service network, with the system open to integration with regional transport operators and other providers.

Crucke has been tasked with turning these principles into a detailed market design and phased implementation timetable, which will then return to the federal cabinet for approval. No deadline has been given.

Preparation window narrowing

The phased model would avoid an overnight transfer of the network on January 1 2033, but it also reflects the amount of preparatory work still required. In a 2024 study examining how competitive tendering could be introduced through pilot passenger rail contracts, Belgium’s federal transport administration, SPF Mobilité et Transports, warned that the time needed to organise the pilots and prepare the post-2032 railway system was ‘considerable’, adding that ‘there must be no delay along the way’.

The study shortlisted possible pilot networks around Gent, Hasselt and Liège, and on the Namur–Luxembourg axis, but none has yet progressed to procurement. Crucke sharpened the warning when questioned by parliament in March, citing the ‘relatively short period’ remaining until the end of 2032 and a ‘lack of preparation resulting from the absence of action by previous governments’. He said Belgium still had to turn its political objectives into a workable market structure before tenders could be launched, describing the preparation as ‘a long-term undertaking’.

The July decision now establishes the broad mechanism for that transition, but does not identify which services will be tendered first or when procurement will begin. The government must also decide whether SPF Mobilité or a new specialist body will act as contracting authority. Crucke said the federal state’s role in organising the public service would be ‘considerably strengthened’, with responsibility for specifying and supervising the future contracts. That authority will also have to resolve the practical conditions needed for rival operators to actually compete.

‘Vested interests’

Liberalisation advocates have greeted the decision warmly, with AllRail, the lobby group for new entrants, calling it ‘welcome news from our home country’ and praising Crucke for ‘opening a path to competition’. Yet its warning that ‘vested interests will inevitably resist change’ points to substantial opposition within Belgian politics and the railway unions to delivering competition against the incumbent.

In a direct response to the cabinet decision, the Workers’ Party of Belgium said: ‘We keep being told [competition] is ‘mandatory’. That’s false. European regulations allow Belgium to maintain a single operator. It’s a political choice, not an inevitability.’ The party added that rail was ‘too important for us to allow it to become a hunting ground for shareholders’.

Barriers to market entry

Whether the reform produces the ‘genuine competition’ sought by AllRail will depend heavily on the conditions under which new entrants can bid for and mobilise public service contracts. To win one, an operator would need to price and demonstrate a credible plan for delivering the specified services, including sufficient rolling stock and access to maintenance facilities.

SNCB currently owns all of the trains and workshops used to operate the national public service. The 2024 SPF Mobilité study found that suitable rolling stock for the Belgian network could not readily be sourced from the international leasing market, leaving a new operator either needing to procure a new fleet or take over existing SNCB trains.

The current public service contract provides for the possible transfer of SNCB rolling stock, but the arrangements have yet to be clarified, including which vehicles would be made available, how they would be valued and how the new operator would obtain technical documentation, maintenance records and spare parts.

The choice would have a significant effect on both the cost and timing of entry. The study estimated that an operator taking over an existing fleet could begin services around 18 months after a contract was awarded, compared with approximately three and a half years if new trains had to be procured. In the latter case, rolling stock could account for between 25% and 40% of the total value of a public service contract lasting 10 to 15 years.

Maintenance facilities present a similar hurdle. New operators would be entitled to non-discriminatory access to existing workshops, but the study warned that reliance on SNCB for a core operating function could deter bidders. The alternatives include transferring an SNCB facility, providing a publicly owned workshop or requiring the successful operator to develop its own depot. The report indicated that, where workshop provision was required, approximately three years could be needed between contract signature and the start of operations.

These arrangements would need to be defined early enough for bidders to calculate their costs and mobilisation requirements. Their ability to do so would also depend on access to SNCB data on passenger demand, operating costs and the condition of trains and facilities. Failure to s